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Protection Sector Politics

Possession and management of protection industrial companies affords the navy energy, autonomy, and a declare to financial rents. Why do some international locations succeed at shifting some or all such companies from navy to civilian possession and management, whereas others don't? I argue that differing configurations of relative civilian and navy coalitional and institutional energy contribute to outcomes. Civilian and navy should discover get together and executive-branch allies who can compete for them to craft or defeat laws affecting their pursuits, however coalition constructing alone is inadequate. Actors should additionally domesticate government bureaucratic establishments in a position to design and implement insurance policies selling their pursuits. How coalitions and establishments type, ossify, or fail to develop is assessed by way of a comparative research of Chile, Argentina (1983–1989), and Argentina (1989–1997).


Possession and management of protection industrial companies affords the navy energy, autonomy, and a declare to financial rents. That allows the navy to favor some civilian financial issues by investing in them and squeeze out others by competing with them and, certainly, forestall funding and trade in additional open and aggressive markets. In authorities corridors, it interprets into privileges, protections, and entry to inside info; affect through the budgetary and procurement processes, and veto energy over the tasks of extra dynamic and progressive civilian sectors. The secretive companies can foster corruption by navy personnel and stitch distrust between inter-state rivals, who lack details about the off-budget income the companies generate. Such income additionally bedevils the civilian authorities, whose leverage vis-à-vis the navy is diluted by the latter’s entry to sources of finance outdoors the price range.

Protection industrial companies and political efforts to reform them by transferring them to civilian possession and management are modern, international points. The battle over such reform or its failure is a important distributional wrestle in international locations the place such sectors typically carry out an outsized position in addition to represent the important thing supply of the navy’s energy in its relationship with state and society. In Argentina earlier than reform within the Nineties, the navy owned in entire or partly 45 industrial and service-sector companies that employed 33,000 folks instantly; loved a monopoly or close to monopoly within the mining, weapons, metal, petrochemical, and naval sectors; and, at their peak, accounted for a 3rd of gross home product (GDP). In Chile, 5 a long time of neoliberal coverage however, the identical three companies stay in navy palms and wielders of a de facto monopoly on contracts to service arms imported with lavish off-budget copper export income.

The political economic system of protection industrialization and of civil-military relations more and more preoccupies students. After international locations defied the predictions of globalization theorists and continued pursuing protection industrialization effectively into the post-Chilly Battle period, students started debating its drivers, then turned to the internal workings of the coverage making course of (Kurç and Neuman 2017). In parallel, Alfred Stepan advised students that “if there's a main debate within the nation concerning the dimension, route, content material, and management of a home military-industrial advanced, then it turns into a problem that requires separate analytic and political consideration” (1988: 82). Successors responded with research of navy enterprise improvement (Mani 2007), navy export levy reform (Grimes and Pion-Berlin 2019), and ranges of navy manufacturing (Acuña and Smith 1995). But navy industrial reform escaped systematic, comparative inquiry. Why do leaders who craft insurance policies transferring some or all protection industrial companies from navy to public or personal civilian possession and management both succeed or fail at what they got down to do?

This text argues that differing configurations of relative civilian and navy coalitional and institutional energy contribute to divergent outcomes. Civilian and navy should surmount numerous obstacles to translate their pursuits into coverage. Actors should discover get together and executive-branch allies who can compete on their behalf to craft or defeat laws affecting their pursuits, however coalition constructing alone just isn't sufficient. Actors should additionally domesticate government bureaucratic establishments possessing the authority, info, and experience to design and impose insurance policies selling their pursuits. Coalition formation and establishment creation develop into important. The place civilian coalitions and establishments emerge stronger, all or most companies shall be transferred; the place navy coalitions and establishments cleared the path, reform shall be stalled. The sector shall be partly reformed the place navy coalitions and civilian establishments each prevail.

Which aspect emerges with comparatively stronger coalitions and establishments is determined by sure components. Events and executive-branch actors drawn to the navy should derive some political or electoral benefit (or no less than no drawback) from supporting financial establishments that dilute governmental leverage. Then, they have to acquire the requisite assist to introduce reform and prevail within the congress, constructing coalitions to beat get together system fragmentation as wanted. Govt bureaucratic establishments whom civilian or navy would enlist to craft or defeat reform have to be obligated to take action. They then should find the requisite authority, info, and technical capability to form the connection between navy and society. These battles shall be assessed by way of two comparative research of Chile (1990–current), Argentina (1983–1989), and Argentina (1989–1997), adopted by evaluation of three different explanations.

Protection Industrial Coverage Making

Students debate the drivers of protection industrial coverage making, however they overlook the politics of civil-military rivalry. One group argues that the forces of globalization lead states to denationalise their arms industries (Hayward 2000; Struys 2004). That imposes losses on highly effective actors, together with the navy, employees, companions, and suppliers, who could align to oppose it. If one goes to craft reform to draw funding, then they have to be capable of get by the opposition first. A rival group holds {that a} quest for energy, wealth, and status motivates states to keep away from change and, as a substitute, pursue better industrialization (Evans 1986; Bitzinger 2003). But reform would create positive factors for the winners, together with personal actors and multinational companies, so the established order’s defenders should be capable of cease the coalition for change. What we'd like with the intention to decide why international locations go alternative ways is a idea of the ability relations that form whether or not and the way reform emerges. This text argues that the relative coalitional and institutional energy of civilians and the navy can clarify the incidence (or absence) of protection industrial reform.

Civilian-Navy Energy Relations

Proof of a job for coalitional energy in legislative battles between politicians and the navy is mounting (Negretto 2013; Grimes and Pion-Berlin 2019). The navy’s affect dissipates with out the assist of actors with ample legislative and institutional illustration to form outcomes, together with the president or prime minister, protection portfolio, and a congressional majority. Nor can the civilian take her energy as a right as a result of her personal erstwhile supporters could align with the navy. Within the contest to form legislative protection industrial reform outcomes of their favor, reform-minded civilian leaders and the militaries who oppose them articulate clear and well-defined preferences, and the protection business creates its personal bases of assist as a consequence of hyperlinks to different industries and to labor and personal stakeholders’ investments within the sector (Réal-Pinto 2017). Thus, civilian and navy actors could be inclined to construct or elicit the assist of coalitions to craft or defeat reform legislatively. For the navy, beholden as it's to the manager department, this implies being discrete and aiming for events, the manager, and/or the protection portfolio to undertake positions that converge with its personal.

But coalitional energy solely will get an actor up to now when the distributive battle enters the manager paperwork. The protection industrial paperwork could also be structured to facilitate navy energy. First, it enhances the navy presence if civilians don't occupy the highest put up within the protection ministry or its employees positions, a protection ministry doesn't exist, the put up of protection minister is reserved for the top-ranking officer, or there's a custom of choosing an officer. Even when the protection portfolio maximizes the civilian presence, command authority could not belong to that minister however to the commanders of the service branches. Second, the protection ministry is probably not empowered to make protection industrial choices, reserved as they're for the service department ministry or different navy company administering the companies. Third, coalitions should grant these bureaucracies wider mandates as a result of complexity of protection industrial reform and the boundaries to info and transparency within the sector. Which means that de facto or de jure navy businesses will get to decide on their program and outline their objectives and procedures. Collectively, these options outline an officialdom wherein choices are reserved for navy officers. Modifications desired and legislated by the coalition that favors reform would neither be ordered nor supported, as company heads would use their enhanced agenda management to perpetuate the established order.

To surmount these obstacles, a civilian chief should come to energy and construct a dominant coalition for reform after which institutionalize the coalition’s energy by reforming the manager paperwork from the highest down. A president or prime minister who's pro-reform and leads a profitable coalition should make political appointments within the protection ministry, starting with that of a like-minded protection minister (Serra 2010). The federal government creates a single division for crafting protection industrial coverage that's managed by the manager by way of the command of the protection ministry. This company progressively acquires a everlasting nucleus of disciplined civilian employees who substitute navy employees and civilian contractors (Bruneau and Tollefson 2006). It begins to develop, construct experience, assume extra authority, and, finally, serve the reason for reforming the protection business. Basically, until civilian coalitions institutionalize their energy first, navy affect within the paperwork will forestall even the strongest coalitions from realizing reform.

Against this, even the strongest navy coalitions can not cease equally dominant civilian establishments from pursuing reform with out the participation of the legislature. A pacesetter thwarted legislatively could cite authorized powers of the manager to create new instruments for performing unilaterally. And though this sometimes limits the civilian chief to pursuing partial reforms, she could impose severe losses nonetheless if she instructions an establishment affording her a monopoly on authority, info, and experience. Accordingly, the navy should keep the requisite assist to dam any effort to reform military-dominated bureaucracies legislatively.

Coalitions and Establishment Constructing

Govt bureaucratic establishments are a necessary structural assist for any coalition intent on executing or stopping sectoral reform (Nelson and Waterbury 1989). Dispersing authority throughout businesses can weaken them, duplicate capabilities, and undermine choice making. Concentrating formal decision-making capability in its personal palms by creating and cultivating a special-purpose government bureaucratic establishment helps a coalition to mitigate these issues. By altering key patterns of capability and obligation, establishment creation produces a setting wherein a coalition retains management over the design and execution of its coverage objectives (Moe 2005).

Not all establishments are equally able to realizing the aim of protection industrial reform. Making a succesful establishment requires that the central administration created to set protection industrial coverage controls credit score and may intervene in sectors by appointing agency administrators and controlling enterprise reforms (Evans et al. 1985). Management of credit score is required to finance deficits which will come up through the transition and block its completion (e.g., from indemnifying employees or promoting indebted companies with out their liabilities). Energy to intervene in sectors issues as a result of enterprise reform have to be saved separate from uniformed enterprise administration, who haven't any incentive to self-reform and can resist it, and since officers should be capable of amend earlier proposals to craft modifications that might acquire political acceptability assist on the agency stage.

Technique and Circumstances

This research of protection industrial reform makes use of course of tracing inside two most-similar methods designs. Upon evaluating instances of protection industrial reform in response to the variables of relative civilian and navy coalitional and institutional energy, I chosen three instances whose values differed sharply. In Chile (1990–current), dominant navy coalitions and navy government bureaucratic establishments emerged, and reform failed. In Argentina (1983–1989), dominant navy coalitions and civilian government bureaucratic establishments shaped, and reform partially succeeded. In Argentina (1989–1997), dominant civilian coalitions and civilian establishments arose, and reform succeeded. Argentina and Chile’s protection industrial companies had been autonomous, advanced from navy infrastructure, and had been created amid arms embargoes imposed by superior powers. Along with controlling for these variables, the comparative evaluation of those instances controls for different explanations by holding fixed the variables of authoritarian legacy, financial improvement, diplomatic initiatives, and strategic atmosphere.

First, each international locations democratized after lengthy bouts with navy rule throughout which the militaries permeated authorities, which means their militaries would have an equally giant stake in defending their pursuits. Second, each had been upper-middle-income international locations with above common ranges of improvement, as measured by GDP per capita, employment charges, wage ranges, robust center lessons, and decrease ranges of poverty. Such financial successes would have offered equally sound platforms for democratic reforms. Third, diplomatic initiatives between Argentina and Chile (together with the settling of border disputes and forging of nuclear pacts) ended rivalry, eliminating existential threats which could have led politicians to prioritize protection. And fourth, each reside in a low-threat atmosphere, which means it could have been more durable for politicians to prioritize protection points. The primary comparability is cross-national: Argentina and Chile; the second is cross-temporal and intra-national: Argentina (1983–1989) and Argentina (1989–1997).

I used within-case course of tracing to find out if variations in relative coalitional and institutional energy truly formed outcomes, figuring out a steady chain of occasions for every case and analyzing processes, sequences, and conjunctures of occasions to make inferences about causal explanations of that case. My comparisons are knowledgeable by numerous sorts of proof. I drew, first, on native and exterior analyses of the protection industrial politics in every of those international locations and durations, authorities paperwork and laws, and intelligence from the World Financial institution. I particularly drew on 400 newspaper articles and texts of legislative payments obtained within the archives of the College of Buenos Aires’s Institute of Financial Analysis. I additionally relied upon 32 in-depth interviews that I performed in 2018 in Santiago, Chile, and Buenos Aires, Argentina. My interviewees had been lecturers who had analyzed the protection industries and present and former protection ministers, company heads, get together members, and coverage advisors. I analyzed the sources utilizing the tactic of triangulation, whereby knowledge is cross-checked from a number of sources.


In Chile, the web page turned on navy rule in 1990, however the navy remained a participant within the economic system in 2021. Every service department operated its personal legally autonomous force-oriented enterprise. FAMAE was the Military’s munitions and upkeep agency, ASMAR the Navy’s naval building and restore agency, and ENAER the Air Pressure’s plane producer and restore agency. Extra formidable nonetheless was the dictatorship’s political legacy, notably a structure granting the navy non-elected senators and management of a safety council that would veto the president’s choices. In September 2005, the Concertación and Alianza coalitions of events allied to approve constitutional modifications stripping the navy of those and different tutelary powers. One after the other, governments of the Left and Proper sought to grab the navy’s companies handy them to civilians subsequent. Their efforts failed, such that “the one space the place the navy does retain appreciable autonomy is in protection manufacturing” (Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017: 102).

The struggle for the protection business was one theater of the battle over the modernization of the state. The corruption allegations involving bureaucrats, state companies, and doubtful purchases that surfaced with rising regularity starting within the early 2000s additionally engulfed protection. In 2018, falsified invoices for US$200 million in alleged gross sales of weapons linked to FAMAE arose in reference to the investigation into Milicogate, an enormous corruption scandal first unearthed in 2011 involving navy officers, copper revenues, and funds for providers by no means rendered. In addition to tanking confidence in authorities, the standard of democracy, and anti-corruption measures, the allegations launched pro-transparency initiatives. Navy-run companies had been focused as a result of they had been considered as uniquely conducive to corruption, and for good cause. Immune from the reporting necessities of the Sistema de Empresas (Public Enterprise System—SEP), the one parastatals which didn't formally reply to a minister or another authorities official, and wielders of a monopoly on contracts to service arms imported with wealthy off-budget copper export income, the navy companies had been flush with wealth and but operated in darkness.

Navy Coalitional Power

In 2007, Partido Socialista (Socialist Occasion—PS) President Michelle Bachelet (2006–2010) vowed to ship Congress a invoice forcing navy−run companies to combine two administrators appointed by the Govt and undertake accounting and monetary requirements like these of different parastatals. Phrase received out concerning the navy’s opposition and that of the ENAER and ASMAR unions, the latter anticipating reform to precipitate privatization and scale back wages, jobs, and the sources of their labor energy. Many ENAER union leaders, firm employees, and employees had been former or retired navy or their youngsters: “in brief, the corporate’s unions are made up of people that take heed to the ideas of the excessive command.” Led by PS and Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democrat Occasion—PDC) militants, so, too, did they type a part of the electoral base of the Concertación coalition of events, which dominated the Chamber of Deputies. Unable to take a place that might alienate its union assist, the coalition sided with labor and the navy. The navy’s energy was poised to exhibit itself in Congress, leading to legislative defeat.

The navy get together coalition delayed the presentation of the initiative, stopping Bachelet from submitting it by April 2007 to the Decrease Chamber. It will now be despatched in December 2007, mentioned Finance Minister Andrés Velasco, however the coalition’s wrangling once more saved the federal government from assembly its deadline. When the Govt lastly dispatched the invoice to the Chamber Finance Committee, in March 2008, it was promptly torpedoed by the committee’s Concertación majority. Thus, protection industrial company governance reform failed when the coalition aligned with the navy in opposition to reform turned robust sufficient to withstand its imposition legislatively by the coalition that favored it.

Navy Dominance over a Weakened Ministry of Protection

Pissed off by Congress, the Govt sought to start reform with out it. In Might 2012, Protection Minister Andrés Allamand of the Renovación Nacional (Nationwide Renewal—RN) President Sebastian Piñera Administration (2010–2014) introduced a partnership negotiated by his portfolio between ENAER and European protection agency Airbus Navy. The Air Pressure would stay the supervisor within the agency’s restore and upkeep divisions and the Finance Ministry would stay the agency’s proprietor, however the Air Pressure would in any other case be subordinated to Airbus Navy industrial and industrial administration in a relationship like that of a subcontractor. Navy objections and whispers of intent to subvert the reform shortly surfaced: the agency’s helms “embody folks drawn from the Air Pressure who, together with receiving a wage in ENAER, are receiving a pension and who, subsequently, won't stand idly by,” mentioned one supply.

The coverage additionally brought on a stir as a result of it demanded a lot from a comparatively weak civilian paperwork, to not point out the cooperation of navy officers in key positions of energy. The MoND’s Division of Protection Trade may merely audit the navy−run companies, and, in any case, remained beneath the management of navy officers (Flisfisch and Robledo 2012). Partido por la Democracia (Occasion for Democracy—PPD) President Ricardo Lagos (2000–06) had proposed to create an establishment for the sector empowered to call administrators and intervene in companies, however the navy thwarted his plans by backing a weaker different favored by the get together Proper. Now, in 2012, many doubted that the MoND may execute its program. For his half, Allamand pointed to a research, commissioned in 2009 by then Protection Minister José Goñi, which concluded that integrating personal capital and administration into navy−run companies was doable and authorized. However few readings of the casual context may have been so sanguine. Luis Hernán Paul Fresno, the skin advisor whom Allamand was pressured to rent to barter with the companies’ officer−administrators, was assembly with navy resistance. The paperwork was set to develop into a staging floor for the reappearance of the navy’s political affect, guaranteeing the perpetuation of the established order.

When Chamber Protection Committee members Deputies Ricardo Rincon (DC) and Tucapel Jiménez (PPD) persuaded the Comptroller to evaluate the legality of the ENAER−Airbus deal, the Comptroller dominated that the MoND lacked the requisite authority. But the officers within the de facto navy paperwork didn't assist Allamand’s insurance policies even earlier than the ruling. Navy inaction tempered bureaucratic advances, making the reform drive extra susceptible to authorized challenges than it could have been had the paperwork been firmly in civilian palms. As Rincon put it, “right here there may be an absolute lack of public coverage for the sector by the Ministry of Protection and the federal government. Even with a press of three ministers, it goes nowhere.” In brief, the incorporation of personal capital into navy companies failed when the navy within the paperwork emerged robust sufficient to withstand its imposition administratively by the civilians who favored it.

Navy Coalitional Power

Although the navy objected privately to assaults on its pursuits, its opposition all the time surfaced. When the second Socialist Michelle Bachelet Administration (2014–2018) mentioned, in October 2014, that it was finalizing a invoice to allow the appointment of majorities of civilians to the boards of navy−run companies, newspapers reported on the navy’s complaints quickly after: “the receptivity of the navy [to reform]? They proceed to point out reluctance,” scribbled one. Protection Minister Jorge Burgos (PDC) pushed laborious for the invoice nonetheless, as did the get together Left and Proper in Congress. Milicogate had put the navy on the defensive and rendered reform electorally worthwhile. And the ASMAR unions, seeing reform as a path to victory of their struggle with the agency’s administration, whom had lengthy refused to grant the unions the suitable to collectively cut price, had backed the plan, splitting the protection sector’s unions and making it doable for Concertación to assist reform. It appeared just like the civilian coalition would sail to victory.

But the coalitions started to vary once more. By Might 2015, the civilian coalition was in disaster. Bachelet’s authorities had additionally pursued tax, academic, constitutional, labor market, and pension reforms, however many of those started to fail in design or implementation, prompting widespread opposition to her rule. A slowing economic system catalyzed the opposition, as did allegations that an ally, Inside Minister Rodrigo Penailillo, was tied to a agency mired in a marketing campaign finance scandal. For months, the navy had been warning of conflicts it mentioned would outcome from mixing civilians and navy in agency directories. Viewing herself to be unprepared for an extended struggle with the navy, Bachelet withdrew the protection portfolio from the civilian coalition by sacking Penailillo and shifting Burgos from Protection to Inside, then appointing former Radical Occasion Senator and Senate Protection Committee member José Antonio Gómez as Protection Minister. A longtime politician carefully tied to the unions, who had strongly opposed Allamand’s ENAER reforms in a Senate listening to, Gómez “represented no risk to the navy, and the navy knew it,” mentioned Jaime Baeza Freer, Deputy Director of the Nationwide Academy of Political and Strategic Research (ANEPE), a graduate faculty administered by the MoND, between 2014 and 2017. The Govt and protection portfolio, now legs of the navy coalition, had been set to in impact enable the navy into authorities corridors to exert its affect, guaranteeing defeat.

The navy government coalition mentioned little concerning the invoice for a 12 months and a half. Solely in late 2016 did MoND quietly dispatch the undertaking to the Ministry Common Secretariat of the Presidency (SEGPRES), its final cease earlier than Congress (Gobierno de Chile et al. 2017: 138). However SEGPRES then went silent. Deputy Marcelo Schilling (PS) and Home Protection Committee leaders resorted to utilizing Protection Minister Gómez’s presence of their chambers to inquire concerning the invoice’s whereabouts. It had left his orbit, Gómez insisted. However the professional−reform lawmakers may see the writing on the wall: regardless of settlement in Congress, the “political will to advance [in the Executive] was missing,” as Deputy Jaime Pilowsky (PDC) lamented.  The protection industrial reform invoice turned “considered one of many reforms killed throughout Gómez’s tenure” mentioned Freer. Jorge Burgos, Gómez’s predecessor and the chief proponent of the reform, agreed.

The reform invoice’s prospects haven't improved as of this writing. In March 2018, Protection Minister Alberto Espina of the second Sebastian Piñera Administration (RN) (2018–current) advised the inquiring Senate and Home Protection Committees that the laws was “not among the many priorities the SEGPRES was dealing with.” Requested why, Miguel Navarro Mesa, a professor at ANEPE, mentioned that Piñera had ordered Minister Espina “to keep up excellent relations with the navy,” whose contestation of reform had apparently persuaded Piñera, too, that resultant civil−navy battle inside protection industrial companies would erase the potential effectivity positive factors from reform. Thus, in 2015–2016 and in 2018, the drive for protection industrial company governance reform stalled when the coalition aligned with the navy in opposition to reform emerged robust sufficient to forestall its introduction legislatively by the coalition that favored it.

Argentina, 1983–1989

In land, labor, and capital, the Argentine navy was the largest participant within the economic system on the daybreak of restored democracy in December 1983. Every service department owned and ran a site of enormous public enterprises targeted within the industrial and repair sectors.The navy had lengthy evaded efforts to separate it from these 45 companies, and was amongst those that labored carefully to dam reform beneath the 1976–1983 dictatorship. Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union—UCR) President Raúl Alfonsín (1983–1989) thought that he may succeed the place his predecessors had failed. To his credit score, Alfonsín handed most agency presidencies and boards over to civilians. However the navy fought off his many efforts to divest it of those similar enterprises. Consequently, by 1989, the sector was occupied by opposing social forces: navy homeowners and civilian managers.

The protection business was the principle battleground in President Alfonsín’s wrestle to interrupt the ability of the navy and rebuild democratic establishments. In the course of the Proceso dictatorship (1976–1983), the navy brass break up over disputes about management, governance, and political technique. Public condemnation reached a tipping level, in the meantime, over a cascade of human rights abuses and a runaway financial disaster. When navy failure galvanized the civilian entrance and additional remoted the navy, creating an influence vacuum, the democratic forces crammed the void and commandeered the regime transition. Now, in December 1983, Alfonsín sought to claim civilian over navy pursuits. Rebuking “a profit-seeking and aggressive minority which manipulated the state, whatever the profound convictions of its personnel,” the civilian president supposed to grab the navy’s holdings and put them decisively in civilian palms.

Civilian Institutional Power

The primary pillar of Alfonsín’s reform effort targeted on administration. In January 1984, he ordered the Beneath Secretariat of Manufacturing for Protection (UPD) to nominate civilians to the boards of military-owned companies. The navy cited the navy natural legislation, which prohibited navy from being led by civilians in navy establishments, and declared the modifications unlawful. But the bureaucratic context had already begun to vary in ways in which gave Alfonsín the higher hand. In December 1983, President Alfonsín had obtained a brand new legislation from the outgoing navy regime (the Ministries Act) creating the UPD, empowering it to call administrators and management enterprise reforms, and transferring to UPD’s orbit the route of all navy companies. The navy resisted, however relented when Alfonsín threatened to go to Congress. A coalition of the principle events had been lobbying the dictatorship for a gap since 1981, making Congress, the brass thought, prone to aspect with Alfonsín. The dustup set the scene for Alfonsín to exhibit his political energy in bureaucratic corridors, prompting the execution of managerial reform.

Energy to Intervene in Sectors

With high enterprise administration energy vested in its civilian secretary, the civilian paperwork proceeded to nominate civilians to the boards of military-owned companies. Dealing with down navy rebellions, it reshuffled to consist of 4 civilians and two navy the board of Dirección Common de Fabricaciones Militares (Common Directorate of Navy Industries—DGFM), an autonomous holding that owned and managed wholly or partly the 13 industries of Fabricaciones Militares and 23 Argentine industrial companies. Then, it reconstituted directories within the mining, naval, forestry, petrochemical, metal, and building sectors. By June 1984, Common [R] Horacio Rivera, who had been president of DGFM, Hipasam, and SOMISA, may lament that “we are actually in a position to perceive what occurs in Navy Industries: By software of [powers granted by] a basic legislation – the brand new legislation of ministries – officers with out navy standing have been appointed within the chain of command of the organism, making a state of affairs that's … <  < in opposition to nature >  > .” As Rivera’s comment reveals, administration reform succeeded when the civilian paperwork turned robust sufficient to impose it administratively on the navy.

Navy Coalitional Power

However although down, the navy was not out. The second pillar of reform, focusing on possession, appeared in April 1985 through a draft legislation authorizing the Ministry of Protection (MoD) to create a state-run holding to soak up the navy’s shares in all 45 companies. The navy objected, as did the unions, with the Asociacion de Profesionales Universitarios de Fabricaciones Militares (Affiliation of Skilled College Staff of Navy Factories—APUFAMI) shopping for advert area to warn Alfonsín in opposition to upsetting “hostile reactions in sure sectors.” The unions’ energy stemmed each from the comparatively excessive stage of unionization and their ties to the Partido Justicialista (Justicialist Occasion, a.okay.a. the Peronist Occasion—PJ), which dominated the Senate. And certainly, the PJ backed labor, demanding that the unions be represented within the agency’s listing; the Senate affirm its board, and Congress management its coverage. And though the UCR lacked the PJ’s tie to labor, it too opposed any coverage involving employee layoffs and, thus, additionally balked. The tables had turned. With the navy’s political energy certain to manifest within the legislation’s defeat, Alfonsín saved his powder dry and deserted the invoice to the gnawing criticism of the mice.

The unions and events the convergence of whose pursuits benefitted the navy disguised their comforts as safety and sovereignty issues. In January 1986, the federal government vowed to current laws to denationalise the navy’s greatest metal and petrochemical companies, prompting navy cries that these had been too very important to development and safety to promote.Footnote30 When considered one of Argentina’s strongest unions, a gaggle of 12,000 protection industrial employees, Unión Obrera Metalúrgica-San Nicolás (Metalworking Staff’ Union-San Nicolás—UOM-SM), agreed, the navy get together coalition in Congress took over and commenced performing in ways in which confirmed the navy’s political benefit and foreshadowed the invoice’s defeat. Peronist Deputy Jorge Triaco warned that “we now have mentioned in Congress that we completely oppose the measure” (Primo 2006: 178). In the meantime, the bipartisan Committee of Trade issued two payments successfully eradicating any privatization effort. Chairman Hugo Socchi (UCR) drafted considered one of them, figuring out 29 companies that would solely be offered through particular legal guidelines and, thus, had been past the scope of the Govt invoice. Included had been three of the 5 navy companies focused by the Govt invoice: SOMISA, Bahia Blanca Petrochemical (PBB), and Common Mosconi Petrochemical. The second invoice, that of Deputy Jose Manzano (PJ), barred promoting companies that “present a strategic good or service for improvement or nationwide safety.” By October 1986, when the Decrease Chamber first negotiated Alfonsín’s invoice, the UCR and the PJ had agreed to exclude the navy companies from it.

Although the Committee of Trade was not the undertaking’s final vacation spot, the PJ-UCR navy coalition finally blocked it. Thus, in 1985 and in 1986, protection industrial possession reform failed when the coalition aligned with the navy in opposition to reform turned robust sufficient to cease its imposition legislatively by the coalition that favored it.

Argentina, 1989–1997

In Argentina, the primary democratic authorities carried out effectively concerning managerial elements of protection industrial reform, as exemplified by the appointment of civilians to the boards of military-owned companies. However when Peronist Occasion President Carlos Menem (1989–1999) took energy in June 1989, the sector’s possession buildings remained untouched and the navy didn't intend to cede floor. In the course of the marketing campaign, 80% of 110 navy officers supported Menem and opposed the UCR’s candidate, Eduardo Angeloz, as a result of Menem was not anticipated to pursue privatization, whereas Angeloz and the UCR had been. Defending the established order was a matter of independence and self-sufficiency, mentioned Common Isidro Caceres. Menem disagreed and, by 1997, had divested the navy of 38 of its companies and turned these over to civilians.

Protection industrial reform was a flashpoint in Menem’s reform of state and society. In July 1989, Argentine capitalism collapsed: “hyperinflation led the economic system to the brink of dissolution, uncontrolled conflicts put the society on the danger of explosion, and lack of governability strained the polity to the restrict” (Díaz 2001: 29). Menem took workplace six months earlier than the set up of the brand new Congress as a result of Alfonsín had confirmed unable to handle the disaster and, as Menem had a majority within the Senate however not the Decrease Chamber, the UCR Deputies agreed to assist any reform payments issued by the manager in Menem’s first six months. Embracing privatization, Menem turned to military-owned companies early on as a result of “the general public companies that did essentially the most [borrowing] had been these concerned in funding tasks in industries the navy favored (particularly metal and armaments)” (Frieden 1991: 207). Certainly, by 1985, the navy and navy business mixed had accrued a whopping 3.5 billion-dollar debt.

Civilian Coalitional Power

Menem launched the primary salvo within the reform battle in July 1989, sending Congress a invoice to denationalise, amongst different enterprises, six of the navy’s largest petrochemical and considered one of its metal companies. (This legislation, the State Reform Legislation, and with the Financial Emergency Legislation had been Menem’s earliest reform payments, and the previous was his first privatization legislation.) But the UCR now reserved its proper to dissent or alter laws, and labor-linked Peronists resumed a hostile stance. Menem thus ignored the UCR and allied with small right-wing get together Unión de Centro Democrático (Union of Democratic Middle—UCD), placing its leaders in his cupboard; sponsored worker share possession packages to sway labor-linked Peronists; and used trade relationships to win over small provincial events. In time, Menem absorbed “a considerable a part of the civilian coalition that, previously, typically allied with the navy in opposition to civilian governments” (Armijo 1994: 29). The PJ-led civilian coalition was geared as much as impose the initiative.

The civilian coalition enacted the State Reform Legislation inside a month. Some analysts attribute Congress’s approval of this legislation to the UCR Deputies having agreed to again any reforms issued by the manager in its first six months (Treisman 2003). The truth is, the UCR Deputies voted in opposition to the State Reform Legislation and even tried to forestall its protection reforms. On August 11, 1989, every week earlier than the invoice’s passage, they altered the invoice’s textual content to exclude the military-owned companies it focused. The Peronist Senate reinserted these companies within the textual content and Menem expanded his assist amongst different events, however the Radicals then voted in opposition to the legislation (Díaz 2001: 246). Solingen (1998) finds that reform stemmed from the collapse of a statist coalition which had enabled navy involvement in strategic industries. This narrative reveals, equally, that coalition constructing made the early reforms doable regardless of, not due to, the UCR Deputies.

The plot thickened on July 23, 1990, when Menem despatched the Senate the primary privatization invoice issued because the State Reform Legislation: one focusing on 27 military-owned companies and designating MoD as the applying authority. 4 days later, Menem dispatched the second: Legislation 23,809, Privatization of Altos Hornos Zapla (AHZ). The Radicals and one dozen Peronist Deputies, led by the dissident Grupo de los Ocho, which had emerged on the PJ’s left flank in December 1989 to contest the privatization program, claimed Congress’s proper to manage the Govt’s actions and demanded that the AHZ bidding course of be accredited by Congress (Llanos 2002: 114–5). But the modifications within the political context created by the set up of the brand new Congress strengthened Menem’s benefit, because the PJ saved its Senate majority and the PJ, UCD, and provincial get together bloc now shaped a majority within the Decrease Chamber. And so, with little fanfare, the civilian coalition imposed the AHZ legislation three weeks later (Llanos 2002: 108–9, 126).

The protection business privatization legislation proved extra contentious. At stake was not simply management of navy divestiture by way of public biddings, direct awards, and debt capitalization, but in addition the ability to earmark in later rounds of navy reform the billions in anticipated proceeds from privatization. MoD and its PJ allies (the Rojo-Punzo) claimed management and supported the invoice, whereas Public Works Minister Roberto Dromi and his allies (the Celestes), looking for to retain management that they had henceforth exerted over privatizations of non-military companies, allied with the Radicals in Congress and commenced encouraging expressions of navy nationalism. All advised, the invoice slumbered for 17 months whereas distributive skirmishes paralyzed the coalition get together. Solely when Menem made the invoice’s passage a high precedence, in 1991, did the Celestes get again in line. In any case, why would Peronists who opposed privatization beneath Alfonsín now assist it?

The Peronists’ reversal adopted from the agency management Menem exercised over the get together. Menem actively used Peronism’s get together equipment to implement get together self-discipline. By late 1990, he had assumed the get together presidency and appointed loyalists to high positions within the get together. With management of the get together’s primary patronage useful resource in Argentina’s closed record proportional illustration electoral system, its record of candidates for workplace, Menem proceeded to marginalize opponents of his protection industrial reforms (Teichman 2001: 78).

That capability to implement unity inside the principle get together to a multi-party coalition turned important in December 1991, when the PJ-led civilian get together coalition inside Congress leveraged its energy to approve the privatization legislation. As Armijo finds in learning the timing of privatizations in Argentina and as this narrative reveals, Menem legislated aggressively “even in opposition to the pursuits of the Argentine Military” due to coalitional modifications favoring him between mid-1989 and mid-1993 (1994: 27). Thus, in 1989, 1990, and 1991, protection industrial possession reform succeeded when the coalition that favored it turned robust sufficient to impose it legislatively on the coalition aligned with the navy in opposition to it.

Civilian Institutional Power

The civilian bureaucrats within the protection ministry confronted navy, labor, and private-sector stakeholders against privatization going ahead of their firms. But the manager paperwork had not modified because the days of the Radical authorities. Like Alfonsín, Menem loved the (now upgraded) Secretariat of Manufacturing for Protection’s authority to intervene in and management the reform of particular person companies. However the place Alfonsín turned to get together stalwarts to employees the paperwork, Menem tapped technocrats, transferring, in February 1991, the Ministry of Economic system’s crew and construction to the MoD. Menem additionally put aside a World Financial institution Public Enterprise Reform Adjustment Mortgage (PERAL II), a complementary US$200 million mortgage from the Export–Import Financial institution of Japan (JEXIM), firm assets, and industrial loans that included a Banco de la Nación Argentina mortgage (World Financial institution 1996: iii).

Management of Credit score and Energy to Intervene in Sectors

The civilian paperwork used its monopoly of experience and data, entry to credit score, and management over enterprise reforms to form the pursuits of teams historically invested within the military-centered economic system. First, it administered compensations that helped to decrease the price of reform for key actors. After Congress had included provisions requiring each, compensations focused to the navy included award of the proceeds from privatization to the navy and the inclusion in each tender of clauses for the safety of protection manufacturing (Llanos 2002: 142). Compensations for the personal sector included market-share compensation through preferential bidding procedures for companions and suppliers of navy firms. Thus, the civilian protection crew granted the Military’s personal companion in Carboquímica Argentina, Ragor, the suitable to accumulate the shares of the agency earlier than bidding opened to different personal buyers (World Financial institution 1996: 16).

Compensations focused to unions and employees shaped a part of a technique of labor cooptation, and included market-share compensation through the reservation and direct award of possession to employees or unions of a military-owned agency present process privatization (De Kessler 1993: 138). Menem additionally allowed the union leaders to manage the employees’ shares, which meant that they'd earn a few of its income (Etchemendy 2001: 16–18). Subsidies had been used generously: to influence UOM to simply accept reform, the federal government forgave $25 million in money owed owed by the union’s well being plan (Madrid 2003: 73). Credit score and agency assets, particularly, had been harnessed to present employees severance funds extra beneficiant than their wages. At SOMISA, the place a drive of 12,000 could be halved, the typical size of the cost was a two 12 months’s wage, and the typical quantity per employee was $15,000 (Kikeri 1998: 24). In the meantime, the paperwork named interventores, trustees who had full government powers to function the largest companies (e.g., SOMISA and PBB) till privatization was full. Interventores expedited reform during times of labor militancy in addition to turned coalition builders in their very own proper.

Second, the civilian paperwork amended some earlier proposals to craft modifications that might decrease the price of reform by offering an choice of early reversal. At shipyard AFNE, it made a tacit deal: in trade for labor demobilizing, the company would chorus from promoting the agency and switch it, as a substitute, to the Province of Buenos Aires (Frassa 2010). At Petroquímica Common Mosconi, the paperwork allayed the union’s worst fears by arranging for the agency to be absorbed by the partly state-owned Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (Fiscal Oil fields—YPF). YPF remained beneath state administration, and the state held veto energy over its governance through possession of a golden share (Yi 2008: 135). Negotiations over the destiny of aviation agency Área Materials Córdoba Fabrica Militar de Aviones didn't finish in privatization, however with the concession of the upkeep of Air Pressure plane to Lockheed Plane Company for 5 years (Da Ponte 2011: 50). That promised to generate giant future returns for the state by enhancing the agency’s efficiency earlier than its return to state management, which occurred in 2009.

Between March 1992 and August 1997, Argentina’s civilian paperwork radically reworked the nation’s protection sector, seizing after which transferring each huge military-owned agency to new personal or public civilian homeowners and managers. The opposition to protection industrial reform of vested navy, labor, and personal sector pursuits was no match for an establishment empowered to manage credit score and intervene in sectors. “Nevertheless, the only most vital issue,” wrote the World Financial institution in its completion report for PERAL II, “was the robust private dedication of President Menem, with out whom these reforms may not have taken place” (1996: v). Thus, the coverage aim of privatizing military-owned companies succeeded when the civilian paperwork emerged robust sufficient to impose it on the navy.

The literature associates navy reform with a discount within the position of the navy. On this respect, no less than a few of the insurance policies described within the Argentine case are distinctive, together with award of the proceeds from privatization to the navy and the insertion in each tender of clauses to guard manufacturing for protection. These modifications changed navy prerogatives not with civilian, however with different navy prerogatives. If civilian prerogatives, equivalent to earmarking of the proceeds from privatization for social spending and the insertion in each tender of clauses to guard civilian manufacturing, don't, in precept, contradict the reform aim, then a few of the reforms described within the Argentine case quantity to hire allocations. Such modifications lead to much less civilian, that's, in a demilitarization course of that generates uneven outcomes throughout sectors and entails politically obtained market advantages.

Various Explanations

Exterior Obligations

It's generally argued that states obligated to align their civil−navy relations with worldwide requirements are extra apt to pursue navy reforms than states not so obligated. Getting leaders motivated to make troublesome however not electorally worthwhile modifications is meant to take being pressured to take action by another person (Bruneau and Trinkunas 2006). So, leaders in states obligated to align protection business governance with world requirements ought to flip protection companies over to civilians, whereas states not so obligated shouldn't. Was that so in Chile and Argentina?

In Chile, becoming a member of the Organisation for Financial Co−operation and Growth (OECD) in Might 2010 required agreeing to nominate majorities of civilians to the boards of navy−run enterprises within the public sector. The obligation had truly been in impact since 2001, when negotiations with OECD started. President Bachelet invoked it in 2007 after which once more in 2015 in pushing for her insurance policies. But these initiatives, and all such efforts in Chile, failed. In Argentina, no such obligations materialized, however leaders managed to attain a radical reform.

The proof doesn't assist the choice speculation. Exterior pressures in Chile ought to have pushed leaders to appreciate protection industrial reform whereas the absence of them in Argentina ought to have saved leaders from doing the identical, and but the other occurred.

Power of the Outgoing Regime

Stronger outgoing regimes can negotiate outcomes extra favorable to themselves than these pressured out by disaster. Navy regimes that dominated extra successfully can use their bargaining energy to safe a job for officers within the coverage course of (Agüero 1995). Accordingly, militaries ought to be higher outfitted to contest protection industrial reform the place the navy regimes had been stronger than the place they had been weaker.

In Chile, the navy left workplace robust, assured, and united. It engineered a transition geared toward securing tutelary powers and curbing the powers of civilian governments. Consequently, between 1990 and 2005, civilians didn't dare to the touch the navy’s companies. Events of the Left and Proper cooperated to strip the navy of its tutelary powers in 2005. However regardless of having misplaced its tutelary powers, the navy managed to struggle off protection industrial reform a lot later. In Argentina, the navy misplaced all powers to manage the transition after financial and navy failure. We noticed, consequently, that President Alfonsín may use a paperwork empowered through a legislation obtained from the outgoing regime handy navy companies over to civilian administrators. But when the energy of the outgoing regime alone decided the result, then it ought to have rendered the navy powerless to defend its administration and possession of companies. It didn't.

The proof doesn't totally assist the choice speculation. The energy of the outgoing regime did play some position however can not totally clarify the failure of protection industrial reform in Chile. Equally, the weak spot of the outgoing regime performed some position however can not totally clarify the partial failure of protection industrial reform in Argentina.

Context in Completely different Time Intervals

Nonetheless one other commonplace account is that neoliberal reform beneath democratic rule creates a context extra favorable to demilitarization than one beneath navy rule (Schmitter 1994: 71). Except the navy controls the state, neoliberal reform presents demonstrated successes upon which to create constituencies for advancing protection reforms.

In Argentina, neoliberal reform occurred beneath democracy and the protection business was reformed then. And the protection business privatization legislation, albeit the primary sector−particular privatization invoice, handed after a distributive battle throughout the civilian get together coalition was resolved. Nonetheless, it was reforms to the largest navy−owned companies (through the State Reform Legislation) that launched the privatization drive. The passage of this early legislation couldn't have been formed by the consequences of earlier modifications as a result of there have been no earlier modifications. In Chile, neoliberal reform occurred beneath navy rule and the protection sector was spared then after which once more beneath democracy (Lüders 1991: 8). Reforms like these tried in protection had, nonetheless, succeeded in different sectors, as within the case of copper large CODELDO, however this had no multiplier impact.

The proof presents solely partial assist for the choice speculation. The concurrence of neoliberal economics and democratic politics performed some position however can not totally clarify the success of protection industrial reform in Argentina. Likewise, the absence of neoliberal reform beneath democratic auspices in Chile can not totally clarify the failure of protection reform in Chile.


The destiny of protection industrial reform efforts can't be understood with out contemplating the outcomes of coalition and establishment constructing energy struggles between civilians and the navy. The comparative evaluation reveals the significance of variations in relative coalitional and institutional energy. These contrasted with the similarities between the instances of Chile, Argentina (1983–1989), and Argentina (1989–1997). In all three instances, the navy elite and sure civilian leaders fought to perpetuate and reform the possession and administration buildings of the protection industrial companies constructed by the navy a half−century earlier. They did so in political methods wherein a number of robust and comparatively institutionalized events fought for seats and effectively institutionalized and ready government bureaucracies obeyed instructions. However these militaries and civilians differed of their talents to defend or reform the protection industrial companies.

In Chile, the navy, unions, and leftist events’ shared curiosity in preserving the sources of their energy allowed the navy to beat its rivals within the races to search out supporters and amass choice−making energy. These rivals had been pressured to look at the congress, paperwork, and president and protection portfolio, at completely different instances, defend the navy and its management of companies. In Argentina (1983–1989), the place labor, partisan, and navy pursuits additionally converged, neither President Alfonsín’s establishment nor the navy’s coalition may dominate the opposite. Although the previous may appoint civilians to the boards of navy−owned companies, the coalition may block the establishment’s payments to divest the navy of those similar holdings. In Argentina (1989–1997), the place President Menem used ways, finance, and experience to prevail over the navy, reforms handed, civilians intervened, and companies had been handed to civilian homeowners and managers.

This paper doesn't intend to disclaim some fundamental tenets of democratization idea or the political economic system of reform. It's true that, as a regime legacy and bargaining mannequin would predict, stronger outgoing militaries can last more within the wrestle to keep off protection industrial reform. And it's believable to say, as do proponents of dynamic approaches, that financial crises weaken actors vested within the navy−centered political economic system. Total, furthermore, reforming different sectors first (or not) does influence momentum for reform, as gradualist views suspect.

The strategy right here makes an attempt to seize, as a substitute, the dynamics of civil−navy relations within the midst of the protection industrial reform course of, stressing the relative energy of the actors. On this extra advanced image, coalition and establishment formation are individually obligatory and collectively ample for outcomes. Analysis past these international locations and durations is nonetheless warranted, and findings within the literature are an excellent place to start out. Learning the Turkish case, Kurç finds that the personal protection companies opposed a proposal to unite 4 navy−owned companies beneath a civilian holding as a result of the brand new holding was anticipated to dominate the market. Later, when the federal government used for the primary time its energy to nominate civilians to the boards of the navy−owned companies, the navy couldn't cease it (2017: 269). Learning the Portuguese case, Barros finds that elected leaders’ use of appointments to the boards of protection industrial companies to represent their political coalitions prevented change (Barros 2005: 96). It will be fruitful to research in instances like these whether or not possession and administration of protection companies was preserved or annulled by way of coalitional and institutional politics. A wider, cross−regional research may generate stronger conclusions, with implications for improvement, democracy, and safety.

The implications are evident within the Chilean and Argentine instances. First, reform impacted the navy’s means to form giant productive sectors. In Argentina, reform successfully freed the metal sector by ending the SOMISA−Propulsora Siderúrgica battle, which noticed SOMISA promote pig iron at beneath value to smaller mills with the intention to preserve them aggressive after which cowl these losses by drawing on the Treasury and overcharging personal companies, together with Propulsora Siderúrgica, which it almost bankrupted (Lewis 1992: 267–8). Consequently, the metal sector reported giant will increase in productiveness, capability utilization, and output between 1990 and 1993 (World Financial institution 1996: 7). In Chile, in contrast, reform failure strengthened the navy’s monopoly energy. When the final personal protection agency, Cardoen, left the enterprise within the Nineties, it cited navy dominance of the market. It's vital that Chilean advocates of protection industrial reform current such reform as a technique to facilitate personal capital formation within the protection sector.

Reform additionally impacted civil−navy relations, which affected the outlook for creating home wealth through analysis and improvement. In Argentina, reform ended a long time of quarrels about who managed what. That made it doable to enhance info move and the standard of human assets. Thus, the Company of Scientific Analysis and Technological Growth, created in 2007, may administer and fund round 100 analysis tasks between 2008 and 2011 (Authorities of Argentina 2010: 275). In Chile, in contrast, reform failure, in suspending key choices concerning the composition of protection industrial governance buildings, will need to have additionally delayed decisions about creating new establishments to advance the sector. As in Turkey, the place, as Kurç (2017) reveals, civil−navy rivalry prevented the nation from reaching its desired aim of protection autarky, the results of these institutional deficiencies was a much less dynamic protection business.

Lastly, protection industrial reform or failure impacted entry to the worldwide navy advanced. Reform made it doable for Argentina to profit from the switch of know-how, technical knowledge, and industrial know−how through integrative relationships like that of Área Materials Córdoba’s concession of the upkeep of Air Pressure plane to Lockheed Plane Company. Reform failure prevented Chile from reaping those self same advantages through ENAER’s deliberate partnership with European agency Airbus Navy and partnerships that protection officers had been contemplating for different companies. The Comptroller’s ruling erased any certainty that ventures with multinational protection firms may very well be launched through administrative means. Extra comparative research of protection industrial reform may shed better mild on these implications.


  1., “ENAER Chile,” October 8, 2012.
  2. Unnamed former Ministry of Nationwide Protection official within the Michelle Bachelet Administration (2006–10), interview with the writer, April 1, 2018, Santiago, Chile.
  3. La Tercera, “Los proyectos económicos en trámite que heredará Piñera,” January 25, 2010.
  4. El Periodista, “ENAER: asociacion tipo three way partnership con Airbus Navy period legalmente doable,” October 15, 2012.
  5. Miguel Navarro Mesa, Professor on the Nationwide Academy of Political and Strategic Research, interview with the writer, Might 8, 2018, Santiago, Chile.
  6. El Periodista, October 15, 2012.
  7. Luis Hernán Paul Fresno, interview with the writer, July 12, 2018, Santiago, Chile.
  8. Cambio21, “Enaer: El forzoso aterrizaje de una privatización encubierta,” September 21, 2013.
  9. Economía y Negocios, “Defensa afina proyecto que moderniza directorios de la industria militar,” October 19, 2014.
  10. Jorge Burgos, private correspondence with the writer, July 24, 2018.
  11. República de Chile, Senado, “Realizan rondas de audiencias para conocer situacion de la Empresa Nacional de Aeronáutica,” June 14, 2012,
  12. Interview with the writer, April 24, 2018, Santiago, Chile.
  13. La Segunda, “Pelea de ministros: El “raspacachos” de Gómez a Eyzaguirre,” August 11, 2017.
  14. La Tercera, “Manejo de sus empresas: El proyecto que incomoda a las Fuerzas Armadas,” March 16, 2018.
  15. Freer interview.
  16. Private correspondence with the writer, July 6, 2018.
  17. La Tercera, March 16, 2018.
  18. Navarro interview.
  19. Overseas Broadcast Info Service-Latin America (FBIS-LAT), “Comparability of Alfonsin’s Inaugural Tackle,” December 19, 1983.
  20. FBIS-LAT, “Commentary by Oscar Raúl Cardos,” June 19, 1984.
  21. Latin American Weekly Report (LAWP), “Alfonsin’s navy coverage,” December 16, 1983.
  22. FBIS-LAT, “Navy Industries to Come Beneath Outdoors Audit,” January 24, 1984.
  23. Jane’s Defence Weekly, n.t., September 1, 1984.
  24. FBIS-LAT, “Iglesias Ruoco Commentary on Navy Modifications,” March 15, 1985.
  25. La Nación, n.t., June 26, 1984.
  26. La Asociación de Profesionales de Fabricaciones Militares, “A la opinion publica,” La Razón, Might 31, 1985.
  27. SOMOS, “Holding militar: Perspectivas para los capitales privados,” Might 31, 1985.
  28. Ibid.
  29. FBIS-LAT, “Colonel Seineldin Mentioned to be Plotting Alfonsin’s Overthrow,” April 15, 1986.
  30. Humor, “La utopia de privatizar el crecimiento,” February 14, 1986.
  31. Clarín, “El modelo radical,” March 20, 1986.
  32. Clarín, n.t., July 20, 1986.
  33. LADB Employees, “Argentine Congress Debates Privatization Laws,” October 14, 1986.
  34. Latin American Regional Report: Southern Cone Report, “Argentina's Menem has Little Time to Succeed The place Alfonsín Failed,” June 29, 1989.
  35. FBIS-LAT, “Common Caceres on Restructuring, Different Points,” November 21, 1989.
  36. FBIS-LAT, “Alfonsin, Others Focus on Navy Price range,” August 15, 1985.
  37. Clarín, “Diputados introdujo cambios al proyecto de reforma del Estado,” August 12, 1989.
  38. El Cronista, “La ley Dromi volvió otra vez la Cámara Baja,” August 16, 1989.
  39. Daniel Lupa, “La política militar de la administración,” La Prensa. December 2, 1990.
  40. LAWP, “Navy companies cleared on the market,” December 19, 1991.
  41. FBIS-LAT, “Privatization of Navy Enterprises Seen,” February 17, 1992.
  42. FBIS-LAT, “Interview with Arms Producer Cardoen,” February 8, 1993.
  43., “El gobierno de Chile estudia incorporar capital privado en las firms publicas Asmar y Enaer a traves de un modelo mixto,” June 28, 2010.